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ABSTRACT
Despite the growing importance of ‘social value’ as a central feature of
research ethics, the term remains both conceptually vague and to a certain
extent operationally rigid. And yet, perhaps because the rhetorical appeal of
social value appears immediate and self-evident, the concept has not been
put to rigorous investigation in terms of its definition, strength, function, and
scope. In this article, we discuss how the anthropological concept of liminality
can illuminate social value and differentiate and reconfigure its variegated
approaches. Employing liminality as a heuristic encourages a reassessment
of how we understand the mobilization of ‘social value’ in bioethics. We argue
that social value as seen through the lens of liminality can provide greater
clarity of its function and scope for health research. Building on calls to under-
stand social value as a dynamic, rather than a static, concept, we emphasize
the need to appraise social value iteratively throughout the entire research as
something that transforms over multiple times and across multiple spaces
occupied by a range of actors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of social value has a long history in research
ethics, appearing in one iteration as early as the Nurem-
berg Code – The experiment should be such as to yield
fruitful results for the good of society1 – and has grown
in stature in contemporary literature2 and bioethics poli-
cies. In the United Kingdom, for instance, research ethics
committees are expected to consider how a given
research protocol enables ethical and worthwhile
research of benefit to participants or to science and soci-
ety,3 and to consider how the benefits of research
evidence for improved health and social care, should be
distributed fairly among all social groups and classes.4
Social value also appears prominently in the recently
proposed revisions to the International Ethical Guide-
lines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects
from the Council of International Organizations of Med-
ical Sciences (CIOMS). CIOMS Guideline 1 calls for
making social value an explicit part of the ethics evalua-
tion and approval by researchers, research ethics commit-
tees, regulators, and sponsors. As it states in part: The
ethical justification of health-related research involving
humans is its social value: the prospect of generating the
knowledge and/or the means necessary to protect and
promote peoples health.5
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1 The Nuremberg Code, n.d. Available at: http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
archive/nurcode.html [Accessed 11 Apr 2016].
2 M. Habets, J. J.M. van Delden & A.L. Bredenoord. The Social Value
of Clinical Research. BMCMed Ethics 2014; 15: 66; A. Rid & D. Wen-
dler. A Framework for Risk-Benefit Evaluations in Biomedical
Research.Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2011; 21: 141–179.
3 Department of Health (UK). Governance arrangements for research
ethics committees: A harmonised edition 2011 (updated April 2012) para.
3.2.2. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/213753/dh_133993.pdfhttps://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213753/dh_
133993.pdf [Accessed 11Apr 2016].
4 Ibid: at para. 3.2.3.
5 CIOMS. Final Draft CIOMS Guidelines. 2015. Available at: http://
www.cioms.ch/final_draft_CIOMS_guidelines-10_september_2015-
WITH_WATERMARKS.pdf [Accessed 10 Sep 2016].
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And yet, perhaps because the rhetorical appeal of
social value appears immediate and self-evident, hitherto
the concept has not been put to rigorous investigation in
terms of its definition, strength, function, and scope.
Indeed, in the bioethics literature, social value has been
employed as a placeholder for a plethora of ideas, includ-
ing: the importance of research; the relevance of
research; the validity of research; clinical value and
health value;6 an ethical benchmark for practices as nar-
row as specific interventions;7 a measure against frivo-
lous use of resources and of exploitation;8 and a proxy
for concepts as broad as generalizable scientific
knowledge.9
No doubt social value has a central role to play in the
ethical acceptability of health research, but might we
come to some descriptive and normative assessment of
its essential characteristics? In this article, we discuss
how the anthropological concept of liminality can illumi-
nate social value and differentiate and reconfigure its
variegated approaches. Employing liminality as an ana-
lytic and normative frame encourages a reassessment of
how we understand the mobilization of social value in
bioethics. The utility of this frame lies in revealing the
stages that unfold in health research and the multiple
thresholds that must be crossed to achieve the delivery of
the public good that is scientifically sound and ethically
robust health research. Liminality can reveal how the
appeal and functions of social value change throughout
these processes as they unfold, thereby necessitating on-
going assessment.
We argue that social value as seen through the lens of
liminality can provide greater clarity of its function and
scope for health research. Building on calls to under-
stand social value as a dynamic, rather than static, con-
cept, we emphasize the need to appraise social value
iteratively throughout the entire research lifecycle, from
the research design stage through publication and dis-
semination of research results, to data storage and shar-
ing for future research. Social value is, as a result,
something that transforms many times and across many
spaces occupied by a range of actors. In other words, we
see social value as undergoing relatively constant change
across all limens (thresholds), as research unfolds and as
the social is assembled and re-assembled along research
pathways.
The remainder of this article is divided into five sec-
tions. First, we provide a taxonomy of how social value
is employed in the bioethics literature. We then describe
the anthropological concept of liminality and show how
using the lens of liminality can illuminate many of the
extant conceptual issues with social value. Thereafter, we
offer examples to illustrate the potential advantages of
re-visiting the processes of research and social value
through this lens, while also reflecting on possible disad-
vantages. Normatively, this culminates in a schema of
five elements (or queries), that are inspired by this heu-
ristic and that can be applied to health research endeav-
ours to evaluate their evolving social value iteratively,
robustly, and coherently. Finally, we propose the example
of meaningful patient and stakeholder engagement as a
paradigm instance of how social value can be assessed in
such terms.
II. SOCIAL VALUE IN RESEARCH ETHICS
In order to develop the analytic and normative frame of
liminality, it is important to consider first how the con-
cept of social value is currently employed in bioethics.
From an overview of the current literature and discourse,
we suggest that the concept performs three key — some-
times implicit — normative roles. First, social value is
employed as a teleological device: social value is the end
of research, while research itself has instrumental value.10
Here, social value is appealed to as the primary justifica-
tion for, or fundamental meaning behind, engaging with
the research endeavour in the first place.11 Second, social
value is employed as a threshold device: it is used as an
evaluative criterion to usher a research proposal over the
early-stage threshold of ethics approval. Within this
reading of social value, two normative appeals are fre-
quently found: (i) to justify resource allocation to
research,12 and (ii) to justify the risk and burdens associ-
ated with research.13 Third, social value is employed as a
protective device: research which does not have social
value is deemed exploitative – directly of participants14
(because risks are otherwise not justified) and perhaps
also of society (because indirect risks and resource use
are not otherwise justified). This appeal aims at
6 Habets, van Delden, and Bredenoord, op. cit. note 2.
7 Ibid.
8 A. Wertheimer. The Social Value Requirement Reconsidered: The
Social Value Requirement Reconsidered.Bioethics 2015; 29: 301–308.
9 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences and
World Health Organization (CIOMS). 2002. International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. Geneva:
CIOMS; Sec. 8. Available at: http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guide-
lines/guidelines_nov_2002_blurb.htm [Accessed 10 Sep 2016].
10 E.J. Emanuel, D. Wendler & C. Grady. 2008. An Ethical Framework
for Biomedical Ethics. In The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research
Ethics, E.J. Emanuel et.al., eds. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press: 127.
11 D. M. Wenner. The Social Value of Knowledge and International
Clinical Research.DevWorld Bioeth 2015; 15:76–84.
12 Wertheimer, op. cit. note 8, p. 302.
13 Emanuel et al. op. cit. note 16, p. 127; A. London. A Non-
Paternalistic Model of Research Oversight: Assessing the Benefits of
Prospective Review. J LawMed Ethics 2012; 40: 942.
14 Wertheimer, op. cit. note 8, p. 302.
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preventing research and its actors from taking unfair
advantage of individuals and of society. Importantly,
these three roles are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, an
appeal to social value can be an appeal to perform all
roles, as it does in the proposed revisions to CIOMS.15
While all three roles of social value are crucial to deliv-
ering the public good of health research, the specific
work required of social value in the discharge of such
roles at various junctures in the research process has not
received adequate attention. As we explain below, a limi-
nal framing helps us to trace the changing nature of
these roles across and through the ethics approval and
research landscapes. This not only allows us to under-
stand better the respective roles for social value, but it
also assists in evaluating social value as part of the
research process itself.
III. SOCIAL VALUE IN LIGHT OF
LIMINALITY
Why Liminality
The anthropological concept of liminality draws attention
to process and transition from one stage to another. This
focus on process and transition emerged through early
ethnographic research of ritual practices that sought to
understand social transformation. In the early 20th cen-
tury, the French anthropologist Arnold van Gennep iden-
tified liminal rites as an important part of the
reproduction of social order.16 Positing a tripartite model,
van Genneps schema outlined: (1) the symbolic and spa-
tial separation of an individual from their existing social
position (pre-liminal); (2) the transformation of their
social status as they pass through an adjacent, often mar-
ginal space that is characterized by a dissolution of estab-
lished social order and hierarchy (liminal or threshold);
and (3) their spatial and symbolic reincorporation into
society (post-liminal).17 Because the suspension of social
order is spatially and temporally limited, such ritual prac-
tice allows for social transformation to occur in a manner
that preserves broader organizational structures.
Crucially, van Genneps well-evidenced claim was that
liminality permeates all societies, and to witness it can
help us understand processes of transition and transfor-
mation in many areas of life.18 Classic examples are the
transitions from childhood to adulthood, from wellbeing
to ill health, and from ill health to death. If liminality is
about identifying significant thresholds – and asking
what happens beyond and between those moments, both for
the individuals involved in a `rite and the broader social
order – then this encourages an interpretation of the rite
of ethics review of a research application as but one
(albeit a critically important one) of a number of thresh-
olds that are confronted and often crossed in the
research lifecycle.
To continue the metaphor of the rite of passage of
ethics approval, once this first threshold is crossed, sig-
nificant transformations then occur. Most particularly, a
research protocol transitions from a mere proposition of
involvement with participants to an actual plan of action
with participants. This implicates a range of actors, and
importantly, it further transforms individuals (be they
healthy volunteers or patients) into active research
participants.
Beyond preliminary thresholds
Demonstrating the social value of the research protocol
(and attendant documents) forms part of the criteria
that must be met to allow this initial transition to take
place. In other words, social value here is used as a pre-
liminary threshold device. Once a research project is
given ethics approval, however, it moves from a pre-
liminal to a liminal phase. But the evaluative process
does not end here. In fact, a liminal framing suggests
that we must follow this process through because the
research endeavour then enters a new phase with differ-
ent implications and actors (such as recruitment of
patients, involvement of research nurses and clinicians,
or the need for regulatory approvals). Moreover, limi-
nality is a temporary condition — we pass through limi-
nality and emerge from the process. This requires us
further to consider the telos of the research process.
The liminal phase itself is mediated by ethical, medical,
and scientific norms, and crucially, it often involves
adjustment and serendipity as researchers encounter
both problems with research design and unexpected
findings.19 This suggests that social value in research
always plays a role beyond its use as a preliminary
threshold device. As Emanuel and colleagues state:
Clinical research is not an end in itself. It has instru-
mental value because it generates knowledge that
leads to improvement in health or health care. It is
15 CIOMS, op. cit. note 5.
16 A. Van Gennep. 1960. The Rites of Passage. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press; B. Thomassen. 2014. Liminality and The Modern: Living
Through the In-Between. Farnham: Ashgate.
17 VanGennep, op. cit. note 16, p. 21.
18 B. Thomassen. 2014. Liminality and The Modern: Living Through the
In-Between. Farnham: Ashgate; A. Horvath, B. Thomassen&H.Wydra,
eds. 2015. Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality. Oxford/New
York: Berghahn Books.
19 K. Knorr Cetina. 2009. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make
Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See also H-J
Rheinberger. 1997. Toward a History of Epistemic Things. Synthesizing
Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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such improvements in health that ultimately consti-
tute the social value of research.20
The apparent tension arising from using both a broad,
long-term appeal to social value alongside a narrow and
immediate social value requirement arises from the fact
that social value performs both a teleological and threshold
function simultaneously. This tension partly exists as a
result of the inherent uncertainties of research. Emanuel
and colleagues call for social value to be a one of eight
criteria for determining whether research is conducted
ethically, but they rightfully acknowledge the uncertain
nature of both social value and research, even of other-
wise rather specific research protocols:
Priorities may change while a study is being con-
ducted, and the cooperation of diverse groups is
often needed to make changes based on research
results. This makes the process of going from
research to health improvements uncertain and ardu-
ous. Assessment of the value of research is made
prospectively before any data are collected. Conse-
quently, determinations of social value are uncertain
and probabilistic, entailing judgments about the use-
fulness of a sequence of research and chances of
implementing the results. Even in wealthy countries
with well-established research studies and health sys-
tem infrastructures, research results are imperfectly
incorporated into clinical practice.21
We would add that the uncertain and probabilistic nature
of social value is an illustration of the inherently liminal
nature of research. We suggest further that viewing
research as a liminal process for researchers and partici-
pants alike means that the nature and content of what is
considered – or should be considered – social value
evolves, and rightly so. The lens of liminality, in further
emphasizing transition and thresholds, focuses our atten-
tion to those points in the life cycle of research when, for
example, a study or results, and their associated value,
were once one thing and are becoming something else.
This also requires to us to be further attentive to the rele-
vant actors, processes and interests associated with those
transitions since all of these might change as a result of
crossing a significant threshold. For example, an archive
of brain scans may have been established with a specific
idea of how these are socially valuable, but their value
could change as new discoveries are made about biologi-
cal markers of dementia, or by linking this archive with
participants medical records over time. The archive itself
is in a liminal state, potentially taking on new and differ-
ent value over time. Liminality therefore demands
recognition that the social (comprised of various actors
operating in various networks) undergoes constant reas-
sembly; the social, as much as value, struggles to be
evaluated as a static entity. Any attempt to fix social
value at an early point in the research process is flawed
except as an unproved promissory pre-liminal claim.
Liminality suggests that matters can and will change,
including the nature and value of social value itself.
The evolving nature of value
The multiple, processual changes in research create new
avenues for value, new entities that are valuable, new
actors to generate or steward value, new populations to
whom value may accrue, and new pathways for generat-
ing further social value. Consider, for example, how the
value of experimental therapeutics and potential vaccines
for Ebola virus disease suddenly increased by several
orders of magnitude as the spread of the virus became a
public health emergency in the face of frail health sys-
tems unable to contain it. The lessons learned from
Ebola have directly influenced the ways in which the
WHO is considering R&D for the more recent Zika virus
outbreak, establishing frameworks and coordinating
activities with the industry and groups studying medici-
nal responses to Zika.22
Applying this insight to social value, we see that the
social is constantly in formation. It can be thought of as
an unstable, if not unstructured, assemblage of different
components that modifies and is modified as research
unfolds. The value of a given research project is also in-
the-making during the liminal phase. It is modified
along with the social as, for example, the downstream
applicability of the new knowledge becomes clearer. Put
simply, the heuristic of liminality alerts us to this trans-
formational dimension of research and thus requires us
to rethink how the coupling of the social and value into
social value is assessed during rites in the research life-
cycle, such as ethics review and protocol milestones, and
how it is assembled and reassembled in the processes of
research itself.
This is illustrated in some recent approaches to
research ethics. For example, Rid and Wendler have
developed a framework aimed at improving the risk-
benefit evaluation of research that is closely associated
with social value as a normative concept.23 Touching on
all three roles of social value as described above (teleo-
logical, threshold, and protective), Rid and Wendler sug-
gest that an adequate risk-benefit evaluation, coupled
with social value, is essential in justifying research,
20 Emanuel et al., op. cit. note 10.
21 Emanuel et al., op. cit. note 10.
22 M-P. Kieny. 2016. WHO Research and Development on Zika: Com-
mentary. Available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/commentaries/
zika-research-development/en/ [Accessed 10 Sep 2016].
23 Rid &Wendler, op. cit. note 2.
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protecting professional integrity of researchers and main-
taining public confidence.24
Interestingly, however, while social value is explicitly
used as a threshold device in Rid and Wendlers approach,
they also suggest ways in which consideration for future
research, such as specimen storage, might affect early-stage
considerations about risk.25 Moreover, while considera-
tions about social value are meant to arise at the earliest
stages of research, Rid and Wendler introduce them along
with open questions, for example, with regard to the defini-
tion and scope of the concept, as well as the actors involved
in such decisions. We would concur. The clear necessity of
introducing a concept as dynamic as social value to what
tends to be considered a rather structured or evident part
of ethics approval, points to the need to engage not only
with the analytic implications of the concept, but also with
its normative and regulatory implications over time. We
suggest that the explicit recognition of liminality in
research ethics and regulation help us to do so.
In summary, health research is confronted with, and
must overcome, multiple thresholds: from research
design, to ethics approval, to participant recruitment, to
data generation, to analysis and research findings, to
publication, to knowledge translation, and so on. As we
have seen, appeals to social value often aim past these
thresholds and simultaneously employ social value as the
telos of these processes, or the end of research, in the
form of (benefit-enhancing) generalizable knowledge.
Liminality encourages us to identify and pay attention to
these symbolically and practically significant thresholds.
It requires us to focus on the need to evaluate and re-
evaluate social value at each threshold, which are likely
to contain a different mix of actors and considerations,
while always keeping in mind its teleological role in the
assessment of research value. Furthermore, the prelimi-
nary and promissory appeal to social value ought to be
recognized as such; delivery of a materially different set
of social values from research ought not, therefore, to be
automatically adversely judged so long as these generate
actual value to the social as constituted at the relevant
time, and engaging the relevant actors.
A pertinent example to illustrate this comes from the
responses to the West African Ebola virus epidemic that
occurred from 2013 until 2015, which we highlighted
above. Very quickly into the epidemic, ethical questions
arose around emergency use of unregistered experimental
interventions, and justification for vaccine trial design
that had implicit, but strong, association with the evolv-
ing nature of social value.26 Interventions that were
formerly solely in the experimental domain (unproven
for safety and efficacy in human beings) suddenly
crossed a value-threshold into the domain of potential
emergency use (provided that data from their use were
systematically collected and shared)27. The establishment
of MEURI28 (monitored emergency use of unregistered
and experimental interventions), one example among
many urgent considerations at the time, disturbed the
traditionally established importance of, and distinctions
between stages of research, between care versus research-
obligations, the value of randomized controlled trials,
and the very telos of research.29 It was suggested for
example, that individually randomd placebo-controlled
trials might not be acceptable to the communities in
question30. In other words a community, under such dis-
aster conditions, may put far more emphasis on the
social value of unproven (and therefore risky) but poten-
tially therapeutic interventions, than on existing standard
and supportive care. Public health emergencies such as
this are an excellent, if unfortunate, example of why
social value needs to be evaluated over time (and even
re-evaluated) by RECs, data monitoring committees, and
other actors, as its scope and strength – what is valuable?
How valuable is it? – might be recast in various lights
during a health emergency. Indeed, it has been argued
that much research carried out during emergencies such
as Ebola, would necessarily make considerations such as
risk or social value shifting targets of ethical
assessment.31
IV. NORMATIVE AND REGULATORY
IMPLICATIONS
Research never happens in isolation from existing socio-
political values and institutions, healthcare systems, poli-
cies, and markets.32 The concept of value, being
inherently normative, is to a large extent context and
actor-dependent. Not only does the question arise:
valuable to whom?, but so also do the questions of:
valuable as determined by whom?, and, by what meas-
ures? Research is engaged with multiple orders of val-
ue33 and sits amid a variety of conflicting values and
interests, not to mention power structures. The proposed
revised CIOMS Guidelines, for example, suggest that
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 P. Calain. The Ebola Clinical Trials: a precedent for research ethics in
disasters. JMed Ethics 2016: 0:1–6
27 WHO, op. cit. note 22. p. 2
28 Ibid
29 Calain, op. cit. note 27.
30 WHO, op cit. note 22. P. 3
31 L.Eckenwiler, J.Pringle, R.Boulanger, and M. Hunt, Real-time
Responsiveness for Ethics Oversight During Disaster Research, 29:9
Bioethics (2015), p. 654.
32 A.H. Kelly & P.W. Geissler. The Value of Transnational Medical
Research.” J Cult Econ 2011; 4: 3–10.
33 Ibid.
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sponsors, researchers, regulators, and research ethics com-
mittees must all ensure that the principle of social value
is met,34 but the Guidelines do not explain in what ways
these actors should discharge such a duty, nor whether
the duty continues downstream (and might branch out to
other actors), nor whether it is based on the tangible val-
ue from the research results or the promised value from
the preliminary ethical approval stage. The challenge is
that at the moment of evaluation, the question of social
value is far beyond the control of many of the very actors
whose duty it is to ensure social value. As Habets and
colleagues observe:
Whether a particular research direction has sufficient
value is at the moment decided by the research
funding agencies, steered by political decisions.
Although the public in a democracy has thus an
indirect voice in the research agenda, it can be ques-
tioned whether there is enough transparency in the
decisions made. Funding agencies determine priority
by constructing research programs, within which
calls for grant proposals are made.35
Under such conditions, determining or indeed
ensuring the prospects of social value are tasks that are
both challenging and politically contestable. It is not
inconceivable that social value as an ethical requirement
or principle runs the risk of excluding projects which,
based on a preliminary assessment, ask broad (academic)
questions that do not necessarily have a direct or imme-
diate impact on health, or that are critical of underlying
dominant socio-political structures. Yet, under the
broader, more flexible interpretation, and conceding that
research is a public good, it could be said that all
research has some social value, regardless of who deter-
mines (or ensures) its prospects. Just as broadly, the con-
cept of social value has been said to protect not just
participants, but also public confidence in the research
endeavour,36 and to provide credible social assurance.37
Such diverse teleological uses of social value within the
inherently uncertain processes of health research, aimed
at a multiplicity of actors, could generate considerable
ambiguity for actors about the precise standards to
which they will be held to account.
In light of the above analysis, we do not suggest that a
gold standard approach is possible or viable across a
wide range of health research, but the examples offered
herein do nonetheless evoke elements of the construction
of social value that reflect many of the realities of health
research as an essentially liminal process. We suggest that
the following five elements and queries can be extracted
from our analysis when seeing social value in these limi-
nal terms. Each is informed by the focus brought about
by the liminality lens, namely, its emphasis on process,
thresholds, and transformations over space and time.
Thus, we have considerations that relate to:
• Temporality: what timeframes, and which thresholds,
are likely to be involved across the entire research
lifecycle? How does social value inform stages in the
lifecycle and, and at the same time, how is it trans-
formed by these thresholds?
• Spatiality: which actors are implicated in which
spaces within the relevant timeframe, and who is
likely to contribute to the construction of social
value at each timeframe? How do actors and actions
operate to take research across the thresholds and
how are these processes informed by social value?
• Validity: how well do appeals to social value (partic-
ularly by researchers) accurately reflect the presence
or absence of value, produced over time? Does the
validity of social value as constructed in the pre-
liminal (research approval stage) change as research
gets underway and evolves, and what does this mean
for oversight?
• Reliability: who can expect to benefit from social
value(s), as actually produced, and in what ways?
• Accountability: who must give account for identify-
ing social value(s) from these processes, and how?
Who is liable if ultimate social value in the guise of
tangible social benefit is not realized?
This schema can be applied by different actors (such
as ethics committees, researchers, and policymakers) to
various health research endeavours, including more
discrete projects such as clinical trials that still neverthe-
less undergo multiple stages across the research lifecycle
(from initial approval to recruitment and consent, to
data collection and dissemination and so on). To con-
sider a relatively easy example: UK Biobank (UKB) is
a long-term biobank study with 500,000 participants; it
has an Ethics and Governance Council (EGC) that acts
as a critical friend and supports the design of effective
policies on its long-term operations and success. The
EGC operates in a reflexive way such that UKB and its
policies are constantly re-evaluated and approaches to
research and participation are adapted to assure they
deliver on their stated objectives, as outlined in the UKB
Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF). The EGF is
determinedly a living instrument that embodies the obli-
gations of the researchers to participants and wider soci-
ety. The EGC advises on necessary changes to this
document over time, and the entire process allows for the
accommodation of changing notions of social value.
This is facilitated by broad consent from participants to
34 CIOMS, op. cit. note 3, Guideline 1.
35 M.Habets et al. op. cit. note 2, p. 6.
36 A. Rid &D.Wendler. op. cit. note 2, p. 144.
37 A. London, op. cit. note 13, p. 942.
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participate in UK Biobank where it is made explicit that
UKB exists to support health-related research.
In contrast to regulatory approaches in more tradi-
tional research practices, relying either on law or regula-
tions to enforce norms of behaviour, many research
biobanks take a complex systems approach to ethical
evaluation of genomic and other health research. As one
of us has observed, this is typified by research gover-
nance policies which promote openness and sharing
(communalism), population-based participation in
research (citizenry) and joined-up initiatives to realize
the research promise (convergence).38 These are all
instance of social value, albeit unspecified.
Admittedly, contemporary research biobanks are well
suited to a liminal approach to social value as they are
constituted to support a wide range of future research
projects. Many have robust governance processes
designed to adapt to changes in social value. Yet a limi-
nal approach can be applied as robustly to other areas of
health research that demonstrate the fluidity and multi-
ple stages in the lifecycle where social value can change
and undergo reassessment.
Consider the example of Guthrie card collections
set up in many Western states in the 1960s. Initially
designed to test newborns for treatable conditions
such as congenital hypothyroidism, the retention of
the blood samples on cards in state-held collections
numbering millions now means they represent a
potentially very valuable genetic research resource.
Many such collections never envisioned such uses;
indeed, most cards obtained in the early period will
not have any specific (let alone informed) consent.
The social value in research terms was simply not
envisioned at set-up. But what started as a matter of
an individuals early clinical record has transformed
over time into a biomedical collection — of little or
no clinical value — probably held and stewarded
today by very different professionals under very differ-
ent conditions. As a recent report has pointed out:
The transformative potential of biomedical collec-
tions for individual, local and global health is expo-
nential. Scientific and technological advances mean
that the possible future uses of the Guthrie collec-
tion are constantly changing and these no longer
depend only on developments in the health sector –
cloud computing and mobile applications mean that
these valuable resources can be enriched and shared
in ways never before contemplated. This also raises
the possibility of a far more engaged role for the
citizen interested in contributing to and influencing
the future direction of research.39
Some Guthrie card collections have been destroyed for
want of a demonstrable social value.40 Others require
urgent attention to the legal, ethical, and governance
issues that can bring about the potential value that they
hold. This process itself could be assisted considerably by
recognizing these collections as existing in a liminal
phase, and by addressing our five elements to elicit the
precise role that social value might play in their contin-
ued existence.
These examples, along with CIOMS renewed empha-
sis on social value, evidence the need to follow a
research project along its discursive paths and trace the
evolution of social value across all thresholds, paying
attention to elements such as temporality, spatiality, and
accountability. A narrow reading of social value would
fit well within a regulatory paradigm that thrives on cer-
tainty and protecting individual rights and interests – as
much of law does – but it fits poorly within a paradigm
that reflects the nature of health research, that is, one
that deals in uncertainty, complexity, and dynamism, and
seeks to promote trust and the public interest as a means
of satisfying the public good of research. The normative
schema inspired by liminality encourages both on-going
reflection of the nature and scope of social value and
also, as we explain below, understanding that both the
social and value are dynamic concepts best elucidated
in a reflexive and inclusive manner.
Such a dynamic approach to thinking about and using
social value is best expressed when we shift our epistemo-
logical frame of social value as a regulatory paradigm –
as a rule for what ethics committees must look for and
ensure at the point in time when they receive submitted
materials from a researcher – to a liminal paradigm,
which can help reconfigure the approaches to social
value to take account of processual factors. A liminal
approach attuned to the elements and queries identified
above means that we cannot simply assume the social,
tacking on the adjective to the noun value as though
the social simply is. As Bruno Latour reminds us:
When social scientists add the adjective social to
some phenomenon, they designate a stabilized state
of affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may be mobi-
lized to account for some other phenomenon. There
is nothing wrong with this use of the word as long
as it designates what is already assembled together,
38 G. Laurie. Reflexive governance in biobanking: on the value of policy
led approaches and the need to recognise the limits of law. Hum Genet
(2011) 130: 347. doi:10.1007/s00439-011-1066-x.
39 G. Laurie, K. Hunter, S. Cunningham-Burley. Guthrie Cards in Scot-
land: Ethical, Legal and Social Issues. Report, Scottish Government
Social Research. 2013; 4.
40 M. Huckaby Lewis. Lessons from the Residual Newborn Screening
Dried Blood Sample Litigation. J LawMed Ethics 2015; 43: 32–35.
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without making any superfluous assumption about
the nature of what is assembled.41
Here, then, social value is better envisioned as a loose
form of a social covenant (or bond) whereby those
involved in a research project pledge in good faith to
make a reasonable attempt to deliver an array of poten-
tial benefits for an array of potential beneficiaries, with a
willingness to re-evaluate what the value is or may be,
and its delivery, as the research unfolds. This covenant
necessitates constant reflection and adaptation, along
with changing understandings of the value that may
accrue, and to whom it may be of value. This, in turn,
requires an inclusive understanding of who may contrib-
ute to, or indeed help guide, such dynamic and on-going
reflection.
At the same time, this processual account raises
important questions about accountability for the pleth-
ora of potential forms of social value. We remind the
reader that liminality is about passing through, and
emerging from, a transformational phase of human expe-
rience. As such, it is crucial both to be open to what
might count as social value arising from this process,
and also to consider who must account for potential
social values that in turn emerge, and how this is to be
done. This is not the same task as realizing social value
from research. Consider, again, the Guthrie card exam-
ple: even if such collections could yield new generalizable
knowledge, their continued storage and use as a de facto
DNA database with heterogeneous or non-exist consent
raises crucial social questions about legitimacy and
accountability. This illustrates very well the imperative to
clarify responsibility to follow social value through these
processes, in whichever forms this might take.
Another implication of social value seen through the
lens of liminality is its impact on the work of ethics com-
mittees. As we have stressed, such a perspective would
encourage ethics committees (and the regulatory frame-
works which govern them) to reassess social value further
downstream and not just at the initial stage when an
application is first submitted for ethical review. For
example, committees would be attuned to social value
implications when considering interim or final reports
tabled by research teams, and when assessing researchers
dissemination plans. Depending on the answers we give
to the normative schema developed, or that we expect to
give to the questions of: temporality, spatiality, validity,
reliability, accountability, we may want to develop differ-
ent kinds of research oversight. For example, if some of
the central concerns about validity and accountability
around open ended uses of existing data or the
repurposing of an existing drug for a specific new use –
whose risk repercussion is considered minimal – are con-
templated, then a reconsideration of social value could
be informed by interim ethics review. This could include
specific plans to revisit the assessment of social value fur-
ther down the line, and could be an extension of the ini-
tial up-front ethics review within the research lifecycle. In
contrast, other types of interventions, such as research
conducted during public health emergencies – under con-
ditions of considerable uncertainty – might benefit from
a model akin to clinical ethics, with bespoke, embedded
and on-going oversight. These are very different proc-
esses for attempting to bring about novel social value in
the face of a spectrum of known and unknown risks.
Accordingly, the changing nature of social value
throughout these diverse research endeavours could have
any number of implications: it could encourage further
investment, changes to trial design or patient/participant
recruitment, or indeed warrant putting a stop to certain
types of research if an ethics committee (or other appro-
priate body) deemed the research (presently and foreseen)
no longer to contain any social value. Our point is that
full and responsible engagement with the shifting dynam-
ics of social value across heterogeneous research proc-
esses maximizes the chances of delivering benefit while
reducing risk and allowing research to flourish.
An integral part of this responsible process would
require oversight bodies also to assess the social value
implications of researchers stakeholder engagement
plans that set out which actors will be engaged to co-
design the research or serve in another capacity. This
would include assessment of the significance of prelimi-
nary results and any substantial amendments to the
research protocol. Not only would this likely strengthen
protections afforded to research participants, it would
also encourage greater stakeholder engagement, which
we discuss further below.
We admit that there are some potential downsides to
conceptualizing social value through the lens of liminal-
ity. For example, iterative re-evaluation of the value of
projects by multiple actors could be practically infeasible
for a variety of actors, be they ethics committees, data
monitoring committees, regulators, or researchers. There
are sound pragmatic and costs reasons why preliminary
attention is paid to social value. Equally, however, fun-
ders and other actors require researchers to maximize
the value of their research, for example, through open
access and/or publication of negative findings. These new
milestones represent perfect opportunities to revisit social
value considerations; as we have suggested, departure
from original promissory appeals to social value can be
justified better if we reconceive social and value in
liminal terms. Moreover, we do not advocate a heavy-
handed command-and-control to police social value.
Rather, we posit a more accurate and socially beneficial
41 B. Latour. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-
Network-Theory. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 1
(emphasis in original).
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way to think about and to demonstrate social value
beyond the mere rhetorical or promissory.
Stakeholder engagement
As a final point, we return to the relationship between
this reconfiguration of approaches to social value and
the importance of social licence. We do not wish to be
read to say that any form of social value generated at
any point in the research process necessarily renders this
process legitimate. Indeed, we invoke the third usage of
social value from our earlier taxonomy in this regard:
the essential appeal of social value to protect against
exploitative research. There is no better illustration than
the classic Tuskegee Syphilis Study example where
research subjects were denied treatment long after peni-
cillin became available for syphilis, precisely because the
overarching objective was the successful on-going pursuit
of the social value in better understanding the progress
of a chronic disease.42 As we have said, an important
consideration in social value is the question: valuable to
whom? A history of abuses in health research reminds
us to qualify our requirement of social value non-
negotiably with the actors involved and affected.
Yet liminality also reminds us about the potentially
transformative experience of being involved in health
research, whether for good or ill. While it is not the case
that research participants must necessarily derive benefit
or value from the research in which they are involved
(indeed, it is usually not the case), their involvement does
place them at a central pillar of the research process, and
as such we would argue that participants are crucial
actors in the construction of the social of social value.43
Moreover, participant involvement is likely to inform
and transform the construction of value from research
itself, as a liminal heuristic reminds us. Participants re-
enter an established social order, perhaps transformed by
their research experience, and potentially as beneficiaries
of the social value of the research itself, but not necessar-
ily in ways hitherto imagined. Further, this way of under-
standing social value and health research offers new
insights into the relation between participant engagement
and stakeholder engagement. In a last example, we con-
sider stakeholder engagement and patient engagement in
research as an illustration of the five elements of social
value proposed above, in particular, spatiality and
reliability.
There is a growing realization of the benefits reaped
from treating participants as partners in health research.
These include more robust research infrastructures,
increased trust (and healthy scepticism) in biomedicine,
and the development of therapeutics tailored to life with
a disease.44 A liminal approach to health research
requires that we pay attention to how such benefits trans-
form throughout the lifecycle of a research project as
findings emerge and goals change. In research fields such
as rare diseases, where patient involvement in research
and development is common, care is needed to maintain
the foundational relationship between medical staff,
researchers, and patients/participants. In such settings,
patients are sometimes both funders and participants of
health research; they provide the economic (financial)
and epistemic (knowledge and physical bodies) resources
needed to make laboratory and clinical research happen.
A liminal approach thus requires that participants be
engaged throughout the entire research enterprise in a
way that maintains the stability of core relationships in a
domain characterized by uncertainty and change.
Patient-supported research provides a unique example
for understanding the benefits of a liminal approach to
assessments of social value in health research. Opposed
to the likes of clinical trials for common disorders,
research into rare diseases takes place in the context of
tightly knit communities. This produces a unique situa-
tion of long-term co-dependence where participants and
researchers rely on each other to make viable health
research for historically neglected conditions. While
attempts are underway to rethink how best to assess
research outcomes in such settings,45 the current empha-
sis in research ethics on a preliminary approach to social
value often fails to recognize how research trajectories
and stakeholder engagement take place in tandem. In the
face of delays and setbacks in research trajectories, or
complete refractions in R&D aims, patient collectives
(and individuals qua trial participants) have been
required to reassess their funding priorities. For example,
following limited success with the development of gene
therapy, and a movement in aim from cure to treatment,
the Cystic Fibrosis trust temporarily withdrew funding
for the UK Cystic Fibrosis Gene Therapy Consortium,
requiring a negotiation between stakeholders in order to
secure the future (and thus social value) of the
research.46 While only one case, the example reveals the
benefits of approaching social value as temporally situ-
ated, embedded, and open to change.
42 J.H. Jones. 2008. The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. In The Oxford
Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, E.J Emanuel et al., eds. Oxford and
NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press: 90–93.
43 E.J. Emanuel, D. Wendler, J. Killen, C. Grady. What Makes Clinical
Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical
Research. J Infect Dis 2004; 189(5): 930–937.
44 K. Saha & J.B. Hurlbut. Research Ethics: Treat Donors as Partners in
BiobankResearch.Nature 2011; 478: 312–313.
45 L. Rajmil, L. Perestelo-Perez & M. Herdman. Quality of Life and
RareDiseases.Adv ExpMed Biol, 2010; 686: 251–272.
46 This observation is based on one of the authors (in preparation) soci-
otechnical history of the UKCystic Fibrosis Gene Therapy Consortium.
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CONCLUSION
The lens of liminality draws attention to the inherent
uncertainties of research as well as the various structures
(or lack thereof) in which scientific, ethical, and legal
norms operate. It focuses our attention on the processual
nature of health research, with its complex interplay of
various actors and factors. If we recast the notion of social
value in this light, we can see that it is not that the concept
lacks strength or scope, but rather that it can be further
exploited as a robust ethical tool. Ultimately, re-
conceptualizing social value through the lens of liminality
shows us its potential as a broad and ambitious reference
point in at least five key respects, and encourages us to be
ever-mindful that both the social and the value must be
revisited and re-created iteratively throughout the research
lifecycle and by all relevant stakeholders. Once we realize
this, we might look for alternative approaches: for exam-
ple, the creation of more flexible and reflexive governance
practices, with feedback loops and iterative forms of col-
laborative regulation, thus allowing us to unleash the
potential of social value as a concept.
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